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We explore the business cycle implications of expectation shocks and of two well-known psychological
biases, optimism and overconfidence. The expectations of optimistic agents are biased toward good
outcomes, while overconfident agents overestimate the precision of the signals that they receive. Both
expectation shocks and overconfidence can increase business-cycle volatility, while preserving the
model's properties in terms of comovement, and relative volatilities. In contrast, optimism is not a
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In his book “Prosperity and Depression” published in 1937, Gottfried Haberler
emphasizes the role of behavioral biases and shocks to expectations in generating
and amplifying business cycles. His discussion draws on a large body of work,
including contributions by Taussig (1911), Lavington (1922), Pigou (1929), and
Keynes (1936). This emphasis on behavioral biases and expectation shocks, which
has vanished from business cycle research, is making a comeback in microeco-
nomics and in ﬁnance but remains very controversial in macroeconomics.1 In this
paper we set this controversy aside and ask the question: can behavioral biases
or autonomous changes in expectations be useful building blocks for a theory of
the business cycle?
As far as psychological biases, we focus our attention on the two biases em-
phasized in the behavioral ﬁnance literature: optimism and overconﬁdence.2 The
expectations of optimistic agents are biased toward good outcomes, while over-
conﬁdent agents overestimate the precision of the signals that they receive.
Changes in expectation about the future, generated by behavioral biases or by
exogenous shocks, cannot be an important source of business cycles in the standard
neoclassical growth model. These changes engender a negative correlation between
consumption and hours worked (see Beaudry and Portier (2004), Danthine, Don-
aldson and Johnsen (1998), and Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2005)). Our
analysis is based on the model that we propose in Jaimovich and Rebelo (2006),
which generates comovement between consumption and hours worked in response
to expectation changes. This model introduces three elements into the neoclas-
1Multiple equilibrium models emphasize shocks to expectations, but these “sunspot” shocks
must be i.i.d. In addition, expectations are self-fullﬁlling, so these models do not generate
scenarios in which expectations do not materialize.
2Brunnermeier and Parker (2005) discuss the literature on these biases and provide a model
of the optimal level of optimism.
1sical growth model: variable capital utilization, adjustment costs to investment,
and preferences that imply a weak short-run wealth eﬀect on the labor supply.
The fundamental shock in our model is investment-speciﬁc technical change.
We ﬁnd that overconﬁdence is a potentially useful ampliﬁcation mechanism.
This psychological bias generates overinvestment in booms and underinvestment in
recessions. As a result, overall volatility is higher when agents are overconﬁdent
than when they are rational. At the same time, overconﬁdence preserves the
model’s properties in terms of comovement, persistence, and relative volatilities.
However, in the context of our model, deviations from rationality must be large
in order for overconﬁdence to generate substantial volatility.
Optimism is not a signiﬁcant source of volatility in our model. The main eﬀect
of optimism is on the steady state level of the diﬀerent variables. Optimistic agents
expect an unrealistically high average rate of investment-speciﬁc technical change,
and so they consistently overinvest. As a result, the steady-state levels of capital
and output, normalized by the level of investment-speciﬁc technical change, are
higher in the economy with optimistic agents than in the economy with rational
agents.
We ﬁnd that autonomous shocks to expectations can be a useful source of
volatility. We calibrate these shocks using the Conference Board’s consumer ex-
pectations index. This version of the model also preserves the comovement, per-
sistence, and relative volatility properties. However, when we drive our model
only with expectation shocks we do not obtain suﬃcient investment volatility.
We conclude that both overconﬁdence and expectations shocks can be poten-
tially useful sources of volatility but are not, by themselves, suﬃcient to produce
a successful theory of the business cycle.
22. Our Model


















We assume that 0 <β<1, θ>1, ψ>0,a n dσ>0. These time-nonseparable
preferences include as special cases the two classes of utility functions most com-
mon in the business cycle literature. Preferences in the class discussed in King,
Plosser, and Rebelo (1988) and Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Huﬀman (1988) cor-
respond to the case of γ =0and γ =1 , respectively.





Capital services are the product of the stock of capital and the rate of capital
utilization (ut). Output can be used for consumption or investment,
Yt = Ct + It/zt, (2.3)
where zt represents the current state of the technology for producing capital goods.
We interpret declines in zt as resulting from investment-speciﬁc technological









+[ 1− δ(ut)]Kt. (2.4)
The function φ(.) represents adjustment costs to investment of the form proposed
by Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2004). We assume that φ(1) = 0, φ
0(1) =
30,a n dφ
00(1) > 0. These conditions imply that there are no adjustment costs in the
steady state and that adjustment costs are incurred when the level of investment
changes over time. The function δ(ut) represents the rate of capital depreciation.
We assume that depreciation is convex in the rate of utilization: δ
0(ut) > 0,
δ
00(ut) ≥ 0. The initial conditions of the model are K0 > 0, I−1,a n dX−1 > 0.
We solve the model by linearizing the equations that characterize the planner’s
problem around the steady state. We use the same parameters as in Jaimovich
and Rebelo (2006).3
3. Model Simulations
We simulate a version of our model driven by stochastic, investment-speciﬁct e c h -
nical progress. We assume that log(zt) follows a random walk:
log(zt)=l o g ( zt−1)+εt.
We use the two-point Markov chain for εt estimated in Jaimovich and Rebelo
(2006) using data for the U.S. price of investment measured in units of consump-
tion. The support of the estimated Markov chain is:
εt ∈ {0.0000,0.0115}. (3.1)
We refer to these two points on the support of the distribution as “high” and









The ﬁrst-order serial correlation for εt implied by this transition matrix is p+q−1.
We estimate p = q =0 .74,s ot h eﬁrst-order serial correlation of εt is 0.48.
3We set γ =0 .001, σ =1 , θ =1 .4, β =0 .985, α =0 .64, φ
00(1) = 1.3,a n dδ
00(u)=0 .15,
where u denotes the steady-state level of utilization.
4We generate 1000 model simulations with 230 periods each. For each simula-
tion we detrend the logarithm of the relevant time series with the Hodrick-Prescott
ﬁlter using a smoothing parameter of 1600. We use the same method to detrend
U.S. data. Table 1 reports variances, correlations with output, and serial corre-
lations for the main macroeconomic aggregates in both the model and in U.S.
data.
Rational Agents The second column of Table 1 displays key second moments
for a version of our model populated by rational agents. This version of the
model generates business cycle moments that are similar to those of postwar U.S.
data reported in column 1. Consumption, investment, and hours worked are
procyclical. Investment is more volatile than output, consumptions is less volatile
than output, and the volatility of hours is similar to that of output. The model
generates 69 percent of the output volatility observed in the data.
Optimistic Agents Next we study the eﬀects of optimism. There are many
ways to introduce optimism into the model with potentially diﬀerent implica-
tions. To facilitate comparison with the economy populated by rational agents,
we assume that the persistence of εt perceived by optimistic agents is the same
as the true persistence of εt. So, optimistic agents assume that εt is generated by
the transition matrix (3.2). However, they also assume that the support of the
distribution is,
εt ∈ {0.00, 0.0115 × 1.20}.
Optimists base their expectations on a distribution with an upper bound that
is 20 percent higher than its real value. As a result, they see the world through
rose-tinted glasses. Their conditional expectations of future values of εt are always
higher than those of a rational agent.
5The main eﬀect of optimism is on the steady state of the model. Optimists
expect higher average rates of technical progress, so in the steady state the value
of Kt/zt is higher than in the rational economy. Optimistic agents consistently
overinvest.
In our linearized economy the eﬀect of optimism on volatility is small. Opti-
mistic agents expect a higher mean for εt.T h i s h i g h e r m e a n a ﬀects the size of
percentage deviations from the mean, which are relevant for the model’s volatil-
ity. As a result, the overall impact of optimism is small. Column 3 of Table 1
shows that output volatility increases from 1.09 in the fully rational case to 1.11.
The properties of the model in terms of comovement and relative volatility of the
diﬀerent variables are similar to those of the rational model.
Introducing News about the Future We now consider an economy with
rational agents who receive signals that are useful to forecast future fundamentals.
At time t agents receive signals about the value of εt+2. The signal can be high
or low. The signal’s precision, di, is the probability that εt+2 will be high (low)
given that the signal is high (low):
di =P r ( εt+2 = i|S = i), i = high, low.
We choose the precision of the signal to be dH = dL =0 .85. Agents forecast εt+2
by combining the signal S, taking into account its precision, and the current value
of εt using Bayes’ rule. For example:
Pr(εt+2 = H|S = i,εt)=
Pr(S = i|εt+2 = H)Pr(εt+2 = H|εt)
X
j=H,L
Pr(S = H|εt+2 = j)Pr(εt+2 = j|εt)
. (3.3)
Moments for this economy are reported in column 4 of Table 1. The presence
of news about the future lowers output volatility relative to the economy without
news since it makes εt more predictable.
6Overconﬁdence Next we introduce overconﬁdence in the economy with signals.
To study the impact of overconﬁdence we consider the case in which agents treat
the signal discussed above as perfect (dH = dL =1 .0), even though its true
precision is dH = dL =0 .85.4 To compare overconﬁdence with optimism we chose
these two pair of values for dH and dL so that they generate the same mean-
square-forecast error for εt as in the model with optimism.
As in the rational economy, agents forecast εt+2 by combining the signal S and
the current value of εt using Bayes’ rule. Since agents assume that the signal is
perfect, Bayes rule, implies that Pr(εt+2 = H|S = H,εt)=1and Pr(εt+2 = L|S =
L,εt)=1 .O v e r c o n ﬁdence ampliﬁes the impact of a news shock. When agents
receive a high signal they overestimate the expected value of εt+2 and overinvest.
When they receive a low signal they underestimate the expected value of εt+2
and underinvest. Overconﬁdence ampliﬁes agents’ forecast errors increasing the
volatility of the economy. The ﬁfth column of Table 1 shows that output volatility
increases from 1.06 in the fully rational case with signals (column 4) to 1.11 in
the overconﬁdence case.
Expectation Shocks Finally, we study the eﬀect of expectation shocks. To
isolate the eﬀect of these shocks we consider an exercise similar to that in Dan-
thine, Donaldson, and Johnsen (1998). In this experiment there are no shocks
to fundamentals; εt is always zero and so zt is constant. However, agents form










4Söderlind (2005) ﬁnds evidence of this type of over-conﬁdence in the Survey of Professional
Forecasters (SPF). The subjective variance reported by the SPF forecasters is 40 percent lower
than the actual forecast error variance.
7When the economy is in state one, agents expect εt+1 =0 .0115 with probability
1 − p∗ and εt+1 =0 .0000, with probability p∗. When the economy is in state
two, agents expect εt+1 =0 .0115 with probability q∗ and εt+1 =0 .0000,w i t h
probability 1 − q∗. Expectations about periods beyond t +1are also formed
according to the Markov chain π∗.
To impose some discipline on this exercise we estimated the transition matrix
π∗ with the Tauchen and Hussey (1991) method, using the Conference Board’s
consumer expectations index for the period 1967.1 to 2005.9.5 We obtained p∗ =
q∗ =0 .82.
Column 6 of Table 1 shows second moments for this economy. Changes in
expectations can, in our model, be a signiﬁcant source of volatility. The model
generates 64 percent of the volatility of output in the data. At the same time, the
model preserves the positive comovement between hours, investment, consump-
tion, and output. However, the results in Table 1 also show that expectation
shocks cannot, in our model, be the sole driver of business cycles. The volatility
of investment generated by the model driven by expectation shocks is similar to
the volatility of output.
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9U.S. 
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Std. Dev. Output 1.57 1.09 1.11 1.06 1.11 0.70
Std. Dev. Hours 1.52 0.77 0.79 0.76 0.79 0.49
Std. Dev. Investment 4.81 3.38 3.37 3.42 3.42 0.80
Std. Dev. Consumption 1.18 0.80 0.85 0.78 0.88 0.74
Correlation Output and Hours 0.88 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99
Correlation Output and Investment 0.91 0.97 0.96 0.95 0.89 0.73
Correlation Output and Consumption 0.8 0.94 0.94 0.93 0.93 0.98
Table 1